WASHINGTON -- Efforts to reach a preliminary agreement between the United States and Iran have intensified despite a spate of military exchanges between the two sides that have shaken an already fragile cease-fire.
Matt Reisener, senior national-security adviser at the Center for Maritime Strategy, discusses with RFE/RL in an interview why diplomacy and military pressure are likely to continue side by side, what Iran and the United States each believes it has to gain from talks, and why any agreement may actually hinge on Israel.
RFE/RL: Where does the US-Iran-Israel confrontation stand today? Are we genuinely moving toward de-escalation?
Matt Reisener: We're in something of a holding pattern, and there are three big issues.
First, the US and Iran still have fundamental disconnects on many key issues. [US] President [Donald] Trump has been very clear that Iran can't have a credible pathway to a nuclear weapon, while Iran is still holding firm that it isn't willing to give up more on this issue than what it agreed to in the JCPOA agreement signed back in 2015.
It's a similar issue when it comes to the Strait of Hormuz. America's position is the strait has to remain permanently open for ships to transit, whereas Iran still has ambitions to exercise some level of permanent control over that waterway.
Both sides view their counterparts as having a credibility deficit. Why would Iran trade in what they think is a winning hand, with them in control of the Strait of Hormuz? After all, Trump originally walked away from the JCPOA. Iran doesn't want to give up what it feels it has gained in the conflict in exchange for an agreement the US might not honor.
From America's perspective, how do you trust Iran is going to adhere to the terms of a deal if you unfreeze assets and provide sanctions relief? There is so much history on both sides of these negotiations that makes each party unwilling to meet the other halfway.
Finally, you have external disruptions, like what we've seen in Lebanon, that continue to short-circuit the talks. It's hard to move diplomacy forward when you're expending all your diplomatic capital trying to prevent both sides from escalating further. The fighting in Lebanon has really emerged as a clear impediment to a possible deal and may be something the US has to address before negotiations can move forward.
RFE/RL: If a peace framework emerges, which issue will be the most difficult to resolve: Iran's nuclear program, sanctions relief, regional influence, or security guarantees surrounding the Strait of Hormuz?
Reisener: None of these issues are going to be easy to resolve. But I'll say the nuclear program for the sake of discussion.
Even if Iran agrees in principle to limitations on its nuclear program, do you reduce sanctions or unfreeze assets before it begins dismantling that program, or after? Iran isn't going to hand over its enriched uranium based solely on promises of future sanctions relief.
Can you negotiate a phased agreement in which sanctions are gradually reduced and the blockade gradually rolled back as Iran surrenders portions of its nuclear infrastructure?
Israel complicates the question. It may or may not accept an agreement that limits but does not completely eliminate Iran's civilian nuclear program.
[Israeli] Prime Minister [Benjamin] Netanyahu has spent years presenting Iran as an existential threat to his constituents. There is a real question as to whether the right flank of his coalition would accept an agreement reached by Washington if it resembles the JCPOA in any way. If not, this conflict could simply resume in months or years.
RFE/RL: Many people associate the Strait of Hormuz primarily with oil prices. From a national security perspective, could the greater long-term risk actually involve global supply chains, defense production, and military logistics?
Reisener: The biggest long-term concern would be permanent Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz because it would set a precedent that other actors can similarly try to exercise control over critical maritime choke points.
If that happens, you're going to see other countries seriously consider following Iran's example. Indonesia could seek greater control over the Strait of Malacca. Russia could press its claims in narrow Arctic waterways along its coastline.
Freedom of navigation through international waterways is not just an American interest; it's a global necessity. Letting that become a casualty of this conflict would be catastrophic.
Certainly, supply-chain disruptions could expand beyond the Strait of Hormuz into other critical maritime choke points. That's when you would run into major global problems extending far beyond this particular conflict.
